Abstract
Introduction
A hybrid system is one in which digital and analog components interact. Typical examples of hybrid systems are real-time process-control systems such as automated factories or automated transportation systems, in which the digital components monitor and control continuous physical processes in the analog components. The computer science community has developed formal models and methods for reasoning about digital systems, while the control theory community has done the same for analog systems. However, systems that combine both types of activity appear to require new methods. The development and application of such methods is an active area of current research.
One formal tool that has recently been developed is the hybrid I/O automaton (HIOA) model [16] . In this case study, we show how the HIOA model can be used to specify and verify part of an automated transportation systema vehicle deceleration maneuver. The methods we use include computer-science-based techniques such as automaton composition, invariant assertions, and simulation mappings, as well as simple continuous analysis. The purpose of the case study is to investigate the applicability of the HIOA model and various computer-science-based techniques to automated transportation systems in particular, and to hybrid systems in general. We are especially concerned that the methods allow faithful representation of hybrid systems (including all components), and clear and scalable proofs of significant properties of these systems.
The hybrid U 0 automaton model is an extension of the timed I/O automaton model of [ 17, 4] , inspired by the phase transition system model of [19] and the similar hybrid system model of [ 11. A HIOA is a (possibly) infinite state labelled transition system. The states of a HIOA are the valuations of a set of variables. Certain states are distinguished as start states. The transitions (steps) of a HIOA are of two types: discrete and continuous. The discrete transitions are labelled with actions. Both the variables and the actions are partitioned into three categories: input, output, and intemal. A hybrid execution of a HIOA is a sequence of transitions that describes a possible behavior of the system over time. A hybrid trace is the externally visible part of an execution (i.e., the non-internal part).
We say that one HIOA implements a second HIOA if the set of traces of the first is a subset of that of the second. This captures the notion that the implementation HIOA has no external behavior that is not allowed by the specification HIOA. When two HIOAs are composed in parallel, they synchronize on shared input/output actions and shared input/output variables. Under certain easily checked conditions, the parallel composition of two HIOAs is itself a HIOA. An important property of HIOAs is substitutivity: in a system composed of HIOAs, replacing components by implementations of those components yields an implementation of the entire system.
As has been the case in previous work with timed U 0 automata, most of the proofs in this HIOA-based case study use invariant assertions and simulation mappings. An invariant assertion is a predicate on states that is true in every reachable state. Invariant assertions are usually proved by induction on the length of an execution. A simulation is a mapping between states of two HIOAs that can be used to show that one HIOA implements another. The proof that a given mapping is a simulation is also an induction on the length of an execution of the implementation; the inductive step matches individual transitions in the implementation with corresponding transitions or sequences of transitions in the specification. Even timing properties can be proved us-ing these techniques: the key idea is to build timing information into the state where it can be tested by assertions.
Our methods have several benefits. First, the HIOA model and its composition operation permit complete representation of hybrid systems, including all components, continuous and discrete, and the interactions among them. Second, the inductive structure and stylized nature of the proofs make them easy to write, check, and understand. In previous work, such proofs have even been checked using automated theorem proving techniques. Third, the implementation relation allows the description of a system at different levels of abstraction. Assertions proved for high level models extend to the lower level models via the simulation mappings. This hierarchy helps manage the complexity of the overall system description, and it helps simplify the proofs because assertions are usually easier to prove on the more abstract models. Fourth and finally, the methods are not completely automatic. They require the user to supply invariants and simulations, which express key insights about the system and serve as useful documentation.
Typical examples of automated transportation systems include the Raytheon Personal Rapid Transit System and the CaliforniaPATH project [6, 5, 131 . In these hybrid systems, a number of computer-controlled vehicles share a network of tracks or highways. The digital part of the system is the computer vehicle controller and the analog part of the system consists of the vehicle, its engine, the guideway, and so forth. In [6] , the control of the transportation system is described hierarchically -the higher levels coordinate and determine strategy while the lowest level performs specific maneuvers.
Our case study focuses on a single maneuver: the task of decelerating a vehicle to a target speed within a given distance. Such a maneuver is invoked, for example, when a vehicle is approaching a region whose maximum allowable velocity is lower than the vehicle's current velocity. We model a vehicle and its controller as two communicating HIOAs. We consider four different sets of assumptions about the communication between vehicle and controller, based on whether or not there is feedback from the vehicle to the controller and whether or not there is communication delay from the controller to the vehicle. For each case, we give a formal specification of what it means for a controller to correctly implement the deceleration maneuver, we give an example implementation of such a controller, and we verify that the implementation is correct. All of our proofs use invariant assertions, including assertions involving timing properties, and some also use simulation mappings. Discrete and continuous methods are combined smoothly, and uncertainty is integrated throughout the presentation.
Our contributions are (a) The complete modelling and proof of the four maneuvers. This case study is part of a larger project on modelling, verifying, and analyzing problems arising in automated transit systems. A survey of the early results of that project appears in [14] . A preliminary study of the Generalized Railroad Crossing problem appears in [7, 81; this uses only the timed U 0 automaton model, not the HIOA model. In [15] , levels of abstraction are used to relate continuous and discrete control of a vehicle maneuver, as well as to relate derivative-based and function-based system descriptions. Safety assurance systems for automated transit are examined in [27] . Current work involves modelling the "platoon join" maneuver from the PATH project [3] , as well as continuing the project on safety assurance systems.
The development of models and verification methods for timing-based systems is an active research area within computer science. The timed U 0 automaton model is similar, for example, to models of Alur and Dill [2] , of Lamport [ 101 and of Henzinger, Manna and Pnueli [9] . In contrast to those formalisms, the development and use of the timed U 0 automaton model has focused on compositional properties [24] , implementation relations [ 17, 231 , and semi-automated proof checking [ 121, with less emphasis on syntactic forms, temporal logics, and fully automatic analysis. Just as timed U 0 automata have been extended to hybrid U 0 automata to treat hybrid systems, so have other real-time models. For example, the timed transition system model of [9] is extended to the phase transition system model in [19] . Phase transition systems are analogous to hybrid VO automata: their transitions correspond to our discrete steps and their activities correspond to our trajectories. However, phase transition systems lack good support for composition and abstraction. The hybrid system model of [ 11 is similar to the phase transition system model except that it includes synchronization labels that correspond to our actions. This allows a notion of parallel composition. The hybrid system model differs from our HIOA model because it has no input/output distinction on either labels (actions) or variables.
The methods of invariant assertions and simulation mappings are widely used in computer science. An overview of these methods, for untimed and timed systems, appears in [18, 171.
Another project involving formal modelling of train control systems, using computer science techniques, was carried out by Schneider and co-workers [20] . Their emphasis was on the use of an extension of Dijkstra's weakestprecondition calculus to derive correct solutions. Other case studies in modelling hybrid systems include two analyses of steam boiler controllers -one using timed VO automaton methods [ 111 and another using the automated proof checker PVS [25] -and a project using a variety of techniques to model and verify controllers for aircraft landing gear [22] . This latter reference also includes examples from automated transportation.
The full version of this work appears in [26] .
Hybrid U 0 Automaton Model
The hybrid U 0 automaton model [16] is based on the timed U 0 automaton model of [17, 4] , but it represents continuous behavior more explicitly. We give a brief summary here, and refer the reader to [ 
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Three disjoint sets Cin, Cint, Eout of input, internal and output actions, respectively. We assume that CZn contains a special element e, the environment action, which represents the occurrence of a discrete transition outside the system that is unobservable, except (possibly) through its effect on the input variables. Actions in x e x t A -Can U Eout are called external, and actions inCZ"C a -Cint VUEout are called locally controlled. We
A nonempty set 0 of start states, a subset of the set of states. This set must be closed under change of values for input variables.
When discussing several HIOAs, we often subscript the names of the various components with the name of the HIOA. We now define executions for HIOAs. A hybrid execution fragment of A is a finite or infinite alternating sequence of trajectories and actions, a = woalwla2w2 ' . -, ending with a trajectory if a is a finite sequence, and with discrete steps connecting consecutive pairs of trajectories, labelled by the intervening actions. An execution fragment records all the discrete changes that occur in an evolution of a system, plus the "continuous" state changes that take place in between. A hybrid execution is an execution fragment in which the first state is a start state. A state of A is defined to be reachable if it is the last state of some finite hybrid execution of A.
The visible behavior of a HIOA is described in terms of its "hybrid traces". The hybrid trace of a hybrid execution is obtained by projecting the trajectories on the external variables, replacing all the internal actions that cause changes in the external state by a special placeholder 7, and removing all the internal actions that cause no such changes. (In this last case, the surrounding trajectories are concatenated.)
HIOAs A and B are comparable if they have the same external actions and external variables. If A and B are comparable then we say that A 5 B provided that the set of hybrid traces of A is a subset of that of B. In this case, we say that A implements B.
We next define simulation mappings for HIOAs; these are used to describe systems using different levels of abstraction. Let A and B be comparable HIOAs. A simulation from A to B is a relation R from states of A to states of B satisfying:
If S A AA sa, S A R S B , and both S A and s g arereachable, then B has a finite execution fragment starting with S B , having the same trace as the given step, and ending with a state s& with s a R s&, If W A is a trajectory of A from S A to sa, S A R S B , and both S A and S B are reachable, then B has a finite execution fragment starting with s~, having the same trace as w, and ending with a state s& with s a R s&.
The importance of simulations is given by the following theorem. Two hiding operations can be defined on any HIOA, one that hides a designated subset of the output actions and one for a designated subset of the output variables. The hiding operators also interact properly with the implementation relation.
Case 1: No Delay or Feedback
In the deceleration problem we consider a computercontrolled train moving along a track. The task of the train's controller is to slow the train within a given distance. In this section we consider a very simple model of the train and the controller. The train has two modes, braking and not braking. The controller can effect an instant change in the mode of the train (relaxed in Sections 4 and 6 ) . The controller receives no information from the train (relaxed in Sections 5 and 6). The braking strength of the train varies nondetenninistically within known bounds. We model both the train and the controller as hybrid VO automata.
In the following subsections we describe the parameters of the specification, give a hybrid U 0 automaton model for the train, define correctness of a controller for this train, give an example correct controller, and prove that it is correct. Parameters All the parameters are constants denoted by c with some dots above it and a subscript. Dots above the constant identify the type of the constant: position (no dots), velocity (one dot), or acceleration (two dots). These dots are just a syntactic device -they do not represent differentiation. The subscript identifies the particular constant. Initial values of the train's position, velocity and acceleration are es, e,, and E,. The goal of the deceleration maneuver is to slow the train to a velocity in the interval [Cminf, C, , , ] at position cf. When the train is not braking its acceleration is exactly 0. When the train is braking, its acceleration varies nondeterministically between [?fin, Z , , ] , both negative. The range is intended to model inherent uncertainty in brake performance. We impose the following constraints on the parameters:
E s = O
The first three constraints just say that the initial position is before the final position, that the initial velocity is higher than the target velocities which are positive, and that the initial acceleration is 0. Since braking is stronger when acceleration is more negative, notice in the fourth constraint that cmin is the strongest braking strength, and Zm, the weakest.
The fifth constraint ensures that with the weakest possible braking there is still enough distance to reach the highest allowable speed by position cf. The right hand side of this equation uses a familiar equation for "change in distance for change in velocity" from constant acceleration Newtonian physics. To understand the sixth constraint consider that since the controller receives no sensory information from the train, it must decide a priori how long to brake. The sixth constraint ensures that the least amount of time the controller must brake is less than the greatest amount of time that it can brake.
The TRAIN Automaton We model the train as the HIOA TRAIN represented in Table 1 . The train's physical state is modelled using three variables: 2, $, and 2. As before, the dots are a syntactic device; the fact there there is a differential relationship between the evolution of these variables is a consequence of the definition of the trajectory set for TRAIN. The train accepts commands to turn the brake on or off through discrete actions brakeon and brakeof f. else w.x = 0 for all t E I the following hold: The train considered here is simple; in a treatment of a system with more complex dynamics, the lemmas of this section would be replaced by more complex lemmas of the same general form. Such lemmas would be derived using methods of continuous mathematics appropriate for the application.
Definition of Controller Correctness
We define a brakecontroller to be a HIOA with no external variables, no input actions, and output actions brakeon and brakeof f. A correct brake-controller is one that when composed with TRAIN, yields a HIOA whose hybrid traces satisfy: The following lemma says that the safety and timeliness properties are preserved by the implementation relation; in other words, an implementation of a correct brake-controller is itself a correct brake-controller.
Lemma 3.3 I f AI A2 and A2 is a correct brakecontrollel; then AI is a correct brake-controllel:

Proof: Follows from Theorem 2.2 and the definition of cor-
Timeliness There exists t E 5 rectness.
m
Example Controller: ONE-SHOT There is a broad spectrum of correct controllers one could consider, from fully deterministic to highly nondeterministic, and involving any number of applications of the brake. In this section we consider a correct brake-controller called ONE-SHOT. ONE-SHOT applies the brake exactly once, i.e., it performs exactly one brakeon action followed by exactly one brakeof f action. Except for this restriction, ONE-SHOT is highly nondeterministic: it exhibits all the correct braking strategies that involve exactly one application of the brake.
We chose ONE-SHOT as an example because (a) it is simple, (b) its behavior is interesting enough to require some interesting proof techniques, and (c) it can be used to help verify correctness of the more complicated controller given in Section 4, using a simulation proof and Lemma 3.3.
We define some more constants:
22"
Cmaxf -2, An execution of ONE-SHOT consists of three phases: idle, braking, and done. ONE-SHOT waits between 0 and A time units (idle phase), then applies the brake for at least B and at most C time units (braking phase), and then disengages the brake (done phase). The ON task governs the transitions from idle to braking and the OFF task governs the transitions from braking to done.
The notation used above is based on [21] . In order to convert this description to a HIOA, the time constraints for the tasks must be built into the automaton's states, transitions and trajectories. We do this by incorporating deadline variables last(ON), first(0FF) and l a s t ( 0 F F ) into the state, and manipulating them so that the brakeon and brakeoff actions occur at allowed times. That is, initially last(0N) = A. When brakeon occurs, first(0FF) and l a s t ( 0 F F ) are set to times B and C in the future, respectively. ONE-SHOT does not allow time to pass beyond any last deadline currently in force, and does not allow a brakeof f action to occur if its first deadline has not yet been reached. The trajectories are simple -there is no interesting continuous behavior in the controller, so time just passes without changing anything else.
The entire system is modelled formally as the composition of the two HIOAs, TRAIN and ONE-SHOT, which we call ONE-SHOT-SYS.
Correctness of ONE-SHOT At this point in [26] , we prove the correctness of the ONE-SHOT controller. In the process of doing this, we prove a variety of properties about ONE-SHOT-SYS, almost all of which take the form of invariant assertions. Some of these assertions involve the deadline variables last(ON), first(0FF) and last(OFF), i.e., they encode claims about timing behavior. These proofs demonstrate the clarity, simplicity and power of the assertional proof style.
Here, we restrict ourselves to two key lemmas that illustrate our use of invariant assertions and deadline variables. The first lemma is used in the proof of the safety property, which says that the following is an invariant of the system:
In particular, we focus on the right hand side of the inequality, x 5 Cmaxf. In order to prove this invariant, we prove a stronger invariant:
This invariant says that before reaching the final position there must be enough distance left to brake, even at the weakest braking. It has as a special case the upper bound needed in the safety property (note that E, , is negative). In [26] , we demonstrate this invariant for each phase separately and combine the results into a global invariant. Here we present only the result for the braking phase:
Lemma 3.4 In all reachable states of ONE-SHOT-SYS, if
Proof By induction on the length (number of discrete steps and trajectories) in an execution. The inductive steps break down into separate cases for discrete steps and trajectories. The interesting cases are the ON steps and those trajectories in which phase = braking. The ON case follows from the invariant for the idle phase. In the trajectory case, we substitute from Lemma 3.2 into the inductive hypothesis and simplify:
The second lemma is used in the proof of the timeliness property. It says that the brake must be disengaged before the velocity has a chance to drop below C~i n f , even assuming the strongest deceleration. Symmetrically, the brake cannot be disengaged until after the velocity is guaranteed to reach emf, even assuming the weakest deceleration. Note the use of the deadline variablesfirst(0FF) and l a s t ( 0 F F ) in these assertions. For example, the expression Zast(OFF) -now indicates the greatest amount of time the controller can continue braking. 
Theorem 3.6 ONE-SHOT is a correct brake-controllel:
This simple example already illustrates several aspects of our model and methods: It shows how vehicles and controllers can be modelled using HIOAs and composition, and in particular, how deadline variables can be used to express timing restrictions. It shows some typical correctness conditions, expressed in terms of the real-world component of the system. It shows how invariants can provide the keys to proofs. Invariants can involve real-valued quantities representing real-world behavior, thus allowing facts about velocities, etc., to be proved using induction; invariants can also involve deadline variables, thus allowing time bounds to be proved by induction.
This proof combines discrete and continuous reasoning within a rigorous framework that helps to ensure that the Tasks: combination is well-defined and the reasoning sound. The proofs of invariants break down into separate cases involving discrete and continuous reasoning. The example also illustrates careful handling of uncertainty. Finally, the mgumerits are general -they handle all cases, and are not based on identifying the apparent worst cases.
The BUFFER automaton appears in Table 3 . The variable request stores a command while it is being buffered. The history variable violation records when a new command arrives from the controller before the previous one has exited the buffer; this is considered to be an error condition.
Case 2: Delay and No Feedback
Definition of Controller Correctness, Revisited We modify the definition of a correct controller to account for In this section we extend the model of the train by nondeterministically delaying the braking commands. Rather than modify the train automaton itself, we introduce a new automaton called BUFFER that serves as a buffer between the train and a controller. Figure 1 illustrates the components and their communication.
In the following sections we present BUFFER, modify the controller correctness criteria to account for the BUFFER, give an example controller called DEL-ONE-SHOT, and prove that it is correct. The proof uses a simulation mapping to show that the composition of DEL-ONE-SHOT and BUFFER implements ONE-SHOT; the correctness of DEL-ONE-SHOT then follows from Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.3.
The BUFFER Automaton The buffer stores a single command from the controller. It forwards it to the train after some delay. For each command, the delay is nondeterministically chosen from the interval [6-, 6+] (where 0 5 6-5 6+). the buffer. We define a buffered-brake-controller to be a HIOA with no external variables, no input actions, and output actions bufBrakeOn and bufBrakeOf f. A correct buffered-brake-controller is one that, when composed with BUFFER, with the bufBrakeOn and bufBrakeOf f actions hidden, yields a correct brake-controller, as defined in Section 3.
Parameters, Revisited Not only do we need to place restrictions on the value of the new parameters (6-, s+), but we also need to revise the constraints among the original parameters. Now the controller is subject to more uncertainty and therefore cannot achieve conformance to as tight a target velocity range. The further constraints on the parameters can be viewed as forcing the target velocity range, 
Figure 1. Overview of Delay Deceleration Model
A Controller
The first constraint ensures that the delay interval is welldefined. The next two are necessary to ensure that the buffer does not overflow. The last constraint replaces constraint 6 in Section 3; the new version accounts not only for the nondeterminism of the braking strength but also for that of the buffer. The other five original constraints remain as well but are not shown here. Note that these constraints in this section are more restrictive than the constraints from Section 3. 
We define DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF to be the composition of DEL-ONE-SHOT and BUFFER, with the bufBrakeOn and bufBrakeOf f actions hidden, and define DEL-ONE-SHOT-SYS to be the composition of TRAIN and DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF.
Correctness of DEL-ONE-SHOT In [26]
we give a complete proof of correctness of the DEL-ONE-SHOT controller. The proof is based on a simulation mapping from this case to the unbuffered case of Section 3 -specifically, from timeliness properties of the unbufferedcase carry over to the buffered case via the simulation.
Since the safety and timeliness properties mention only variables in TRAIN, it may seem surprising that the simulation mapping excludes TRAIN. The simulation mapping implies that the external behavior of DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF to ONE-SHOT. The safety and DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF is a subset Of the external behavior of ONE-SHOT. Since this external behavior is all the input that TRAIN receives, TRAIN'S behavior in the buffered case is a subset of its behavior in the unbuffered case. Therefore, the safety and timeliness properties, which involve only variables of TRAIN, carry over from the unbuffered case to the buffered case.
We present the simulation relation R from DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF to ONE-SHOT. The key insight is that since external behavior must be preserved, the timing of the external actions, brakeon and brakeof f, must coincide in the two systems. Let s denote a state in the implementation (DEL-ONE-SHOT-AND-BUF), and U denote a state in the specification (ONE-SHOT); the states are related via R when the following two conditions hold: In this section we (briefly) describe a more complex model of the deceleration problem in which the train provides the controller with sensor feedback at regular intervals, allowing the controller to adjust its proposed acceleration. Figure 2 illustrates the components and their communication.
Our new version of the train automaton, SENSOR-TRAIN, reports its acceleration, velocity and position in a status message every 6, time units. (In order to express this in terms of an HIOA, we add a lust(STATUS) deadline component and manage it appropriately.) SENSOR-TRAIN has an accel(a) input action for each real number a, which causes the actual acceleration to be set to anything in the interval [a -E,,, a]. The proposed acceleration a is remembered in a variable ucc.
We model a controller ZIG-ZAG that performs an accel output immediately after receiving each status input. It initially requests an acceleration a such that, if SENSOR-TRAIN followed a exactly, it would reach velocity exactly Cm, f when x = cf. Since the train might actually decelerate faster than a, Z I G Z A G might observe at any sample point that the train is going slower than expected. In this case, ZIG-ZAG does not change a until the velocity actually becomes 5 Cmmf. Thereafter, at each sample point, ZIG-ZAG requests an acceleration that aims to reach Cmaxf at exactly the following sample point.
We prove the same two properties for this case as we did for the no-feedback case, but for tighter bounds on the final velocity. Note the use of the last(STATUS) deadline to express the time until the next sample point. This lemma is proved by induction.
This example illustrates how our methods can be used to handle more complicated examples, including periodic sampling and control. It shows how to reason about periodic sampling using intermediate invariants involving the last(STATUS) deadline: The controller issues control requests to the system at sample times, but can "lose control" of the system's behavior between sample points; the invariants are used to bound how badly the system's performance can degrade between sample points.
li: + ( U C C -E~,)(ZUS~(STATUS) -now) 1 Cminf.
Case 4: Delay and Feedback
This case is more complicated in its details, but does not require any new ideas not present in the previous three cases. We omit the details here.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated how hybrid I/O automata and their associated proof techniques can be applied to a nontrivial hybrid system case study. These techniques include HIOA composition, invariants, and simulations, combined with the usual techniques of continuous analysis. The case study proves safety and timeliness properties for four deceleration controllers under different communication models.
We model all system components, both continuous and discrete, and the interactions among them. Deadline variables are used to express timing restrictions. Correctness conditions are formulated in terms of the real-world components of the systems.
The correctness proofs are based predominantly on invariant assertions, including assertions involving realvalued quantities representing real-world behavior, and assertions involving deadline variables representing timing restrictions. The systems are described at different levels of abstraction, with simulation mappings used to connect the levels. Deadline variables are used to reason about periodic sampling. The proofs combine discrete and continuous reasoning within a single framework. Uncertainty is handled carefully throughout. The proofs cover all cases, not just the apparent worst cases. The proofs are clear and scale well from the simplest case to the feedback with delay case. Our work does not supplant the usual methods of continuous mathematics, but rather incorporates them. We do not provide any new methods for deriving controllers, but rather a framework for understanding their requirements and for verifying that proposed controllers work correctly.
It remains to apply these techniques to additional case studies in automated transportation, especially those with complex discrete activity. We are currently modelling multivehicle maneuvers arising in the California PATH project [6, 5, 131. We are also extending the preliminary treatment of safety systems in [27] to handle additional safety checks. T h e related discipline of air traffic control should also provide some interesting case studies.
It also remains to integrate into our framework the techniques of relevant disciplines such as control theory. For example, it would b e useful to have a catalog of results from control theory that are especially useful for reasoning about transportation systems using HIOAs. Another direction is to develop computer tools to support the representation, specification and verification of such systems using HIOAs. All of this work should lead toward a long-term goal of developing industrial strength formal tools to help in the design of real transportation systems.
